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This paper examines the causes of wrongful imprisonment, the nature of losses and the applicability 
of international approaches and conventions. Definitions of wrongful conviction vary internationally, 
as do the circumstances and amount of compensation. Australian states and territories can make 
discretionary ex gratia payments, although determination of compensation amounts is unclear. 
Compensation levels for wrongful conviction in Australia are not as generous as tortious claims.  
The current system of ex gratia payments that exists in all Australian jurisdictions (other than the 
Australian Capital Territory) is arbitrary. The introduction of dedicated legislation or specific guidelines 
for wrongful conviction would help bring these Australian jurisdictions into line with international 
human rights best practice. This paper considers the scope of claims made in Australia through 
some key case studies. However, there is currently no reliable national data on the prevalence of 
wrongful convictions in Australia; overseas research suggests wrongful convictions may be less  
rare than we assume. 
Judy Putt 
General Manager, Research
Wrongfully convicted people commonly feel emotions ranging from anger and loss to paranoia and 
betrayal. The long-term effects have been likened to that of war veterans; many wrongfully convicted 
people experience ongoing psychiatric dysfunction and have long-term difficulties reintegrating into 
society (Grounds 2004). 
Currently, most Australian jurisdictions are not generous, nor are they transparent, in awarding 
compensation. Many wrongfully convicted people in Australia do not get any compensation, do not 
get their legal fees paid for, and the reasons for decisions as to whether or how much to compensate 
them are never disclosed. 
This paper considers the mechanisms used for compensating wrongfully convicted people in 
Australian jurisdictions as well as the causes of wrongful imprisonment, the nature of the loss suffered 
by wrongfully imprisoned people and the prevalence of wrongful conviction. It also discusses the 
international conventions in this area and the approaches of other national jurisdictions. The question 
of whether Australian jurisdictions need specific institutions to review cases to detect wrongful 
convictions is beyond the scope of this paper (see Gould 2004 regarding such bodies in the United 
States; Weathered 2007).
Defining wrongful conviction
The term ‘wrongful conviction’ could encompass situations where people are:
arrested and detained but released without being charged •	
detained and charged but whose charges are dropped prior to trial •	
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tried and acquitted but who have •	
been remanded and denied bail 
convicted but whose conviction has •	
been quashed on appeal (this can 
also be divided into people who have, 
or have not, been granted bail prior to 
trial and/or after being convicted and 
the conviction being overturned) 
convicted and have been sentenced to •	
a non-custodial sanction that has been 
served/enforced prior to the appeal 
being heard (but whose conviction  
has been quashed on appeal)
tried and convicted, have exhausted •	
all appeals but who later have  
their convictions quashed in an 
extraordinary appeal and no retrial 
ordered, or are found not guilty at 
such a retrial or have been pardoned 
(Huff 2002a; New Zealand Law 
Reform Commission 1998).
Arguably, all these categories of people 
deserve some form of restitution. For this 
paper, wrongful conviction will be limited 
to the last category outlined above. This 
definition of wrongful conviction most 
closely approximates that adopted in  
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) (see below) and 
the approach of most signatories to it. 
The ICCPR and  
wrongful conviction
Article 14(6) of the ICCPR provides:
When a person has by a final 
decision been convicted of  
a criminal offence and when 
subsequently his conviction has 
been reversed or he has been 
pardoned on the ground that a new 
or newly discovered fact shows 
conclusively that there has been a 
miscarriage of justice, the person 
who has suffered punishment as a 
result of such conviction shall be 
compensated according to law, 
unless it is proved that the non-
disclosure of the unknown fact in 
time is wholly or partly attributable 
to him (see Note 1).
Of the 160 States Parties that have 
ratified the ICCPR, nine countries made 
reservations to article 14(6). Trinidad  
and Tobago, Malta, Guyana, Belize and 
Bangladesh have expressly recognised 
the right to compensation but have 
stated that they are too impoverished to 
implement such a system. Ireland has 
since withdrawn its reservation. This 
leaves the United States, New Zealand 
and Australia (Costa 2005).
Australia has maintained the following 
reservation to the ICCPR:
[T]he provision of compensation  
for miscarriage of justice in the 
circumstances contemplated in 
paragraph 6 of article 14 may be  
by administrative procedures rather 
than pursuant to specific legal 
provision (see Note 2).
States Parties to the ICCPR meet their 
obligations under article 14(6) in one or 
more of the following ways: incorporation 
of the article (or a rewording of the article) 
directly into domestic legislation to create 
a statutory right to compensation; 
conferring a dedicated discretion on  
an administrative or judicial body  
to determine whether awards of 
compensation should be paid; and 
utilising the general power of domestic 
governments to make ex gratia payments. 
The United Kingdom has directly 
incorporated article 14(6) into its domestic 
legislation under the Criminal Justice Act 
1988 (UK), s 133. A wrongfully convicted 
person must make an application to the 
Secretary of State who determines 
applications for compensation on the 
criteria set out in s 133. If the criteria are 
met, the claim is sent to an assessor who 
determines how much compensation to 
pay using principles analogous to normal 
civil damages. The incorporation into the 
UK legislation of a right to compensation 
has not caused a spike in payouts to 
wrongfully convicted people or ‘opened 
the floodgates’ since its implementation 
nearly 20 years ago (Costa 2005; Taylor 
2003). 
New Zealand has adopted a guided 
discretionary system of compensation 
under the Compensation and Ex Gratia 
Payments for Persons Wrongly Convicted 
and Imprisoned in Criminal Cases (POL 
Min (01) 34/5, 12 December 2001). 
Compensation is still ex gratia payments, 
so there is no actual right to 
compensation. However, discretion as to 
whether, and how much, compensation 
should be paid is structured by guidelines, 
which are publicly available. The Minister 
of Justice will refer matters to a Queen’s 
Counsel who will first determine whether 
compensation should be paid and, if so, 
recommend to the Minister how much 
should be paid. The applicant must prove 
on the balance of probabilities that they 
are innocent, after which a determination 
of damages will follow. The applicant may 
also make submissions on quantum. The 
guidelines set out criteria for determining 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss and  
set a starting point of NZ$100,000 of 
pecuniary loss for each year served in jail. 
They also specifically state that, as a 
matter of policy, compensation should be 
akin to that payable for the tort of false 
imprisonment (Patterson 2004).
Most US jurisdictions make use of  
ex gratia payments to compensate 
wrongfully convicted people. 
Compensating wrongful 
conviction in Australia
Individuals wrongfully convicted and 
imprisoned do not have a common law 
or statutory right to compensation in any 
Australian jurisdictions other than the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT). 
However, a state or territory government 
may choose to make an ex gratia 
payment either on its own accord or as  
a result of a request by a party for such  
a payment. 
An ex gratia payment is a ‘[p]ayment of 
money made or given as a concession, 
without legal compulsion’ (Butterworth 
2004). The term literally means ‘out of 
grace’ rather than as a debt of justice. 
State and territory governments are not 
obliged to make ex gratia payments in 
respect of wrongful convictions and a 
decision to refuse to make a payment is 
not reviewable in any way (Butterworth 
2007). Ex gratia payments are made in  
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a wide range of situations other than to 
compensate for wrongful convictions, 
including as a means of implementing 
financial aid packages to individuals after 
natural disasters. In some Australian 
jurisdictions, the relevant Attorney-
General’s office may publish general 
guidelines detailing the factors normally 
assessed in awarding ex gratia 
payments. Sometimes, specific 
guidelines may be promulgated to  
deal with particular types of payments. 
There are currently no publicly available 
guidelines in any Australian jurisdiction 
specifically dealing with ex gratia 
payments for wrongful conviction. 
Beyond that a conviction was wrongful, it 
is difficult to identify the factors that need 
to be present for a wrongfully convicted 
person to be compensated, nor how 
such compensation will be quantified.  
A high public profile seems to be a  
good start in terms of background 
circumstances, although even this does 
not guarantee success (Percy 2007).
Occasionally, facts surrounding a 
wrongful conviction may also support 
tortious claims, such as a false 
imprisonment, malicious prosecution or 
misfeasance (New Zealand Law Reform 
Commission 1998; Percy 2007). These 
tortious causes of action are very difficult 
to prove. Even very compelling cases of 
wrongful conviction will generally not give 
rise to a successful claim in tort. They 
require specific additional facts to be 
present beyond simply that a conviction 
was wrongful. As such, the protections 
offered in tort law to wrongfully convicted 
people are more of theoretical rather than 
practical utility.
The other type of award that needs to be 
distinguished from compensation is legal 
costs. Normally a successful criminal 
defendant will not be awarded the legal 
costs expended in defending criminal 
charges. However, where there have 
been malfunctions in the criminal 
process, courts in some Australian 
jurisdictions may award legal costs to  
a defendant (Fox 2005: 78, 307–308). 
Such awards relate to legal costs 
expended, not compensation.
The ACT approach
The Australian Capital Territory has 
incorporated a slightly reworded version 
of article 14(6) within ACT legislation. 
Under s 23 of the Human Rights Act 2004 
(ACT), an individual who is wrongfully 
convicted of a criminal offence may seek 
compensation. The individual must have: 
been convicted of a criminal offence •	
by a final decision of a court 
suffered punishment because of the •	
conviction
had the conviction reversed (or been •	
pardoned) on the ground that a new 
or newly discovered fact shows 
conclusively that there has been  
a miscarriage of justice. 
Section 23(2) provides that the individual 
will have a right to be compensated 
‘according to law’. 
It appears that the convicted person does 
not need to have been imprisoned – a 
lesser sanction, such as a fine or even  
the recording of a conviction alone, may 
amount to punishment on the wording  
of the section. However, s 23(3) provides 
that the right to compensation is 
contingent upon the conviction being 
reversed or the person being pardoned  
as a result of a new fact showing 
conclusively that there has been a 
miscarriage of justice. It is unclear how 
broadly this will be construed – in the 
United Kingdom, which has similarly 
worded legislation, it has been established 
that the discovery that a law under which 
a person has been convicted is ultra vires 
(going beyond the legal power of an 
authority) will not amount to ‘discovery of 
new fact’ (Taylor 2003, UK R v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Howse [1993] COD 494). 
It is also not clear how compensation will 
be quantified in respect of a wrongful 
conviction, nor is it clear whether 
compensation will be available for 
convictions for both indictable and 
summary offences. The Act does not 
define the phrase ‘according to law’ or 
‘criminal offence’, nor do the Explanatory 
Statement and Second Reading Speech 
to the Bill in which the Act was legislated. 
There have been no cases determined 
under s 23 to date, but it is probable  
that compensation would be paid in 
accordance with accepted heads of 
tortious damages (i.e. with a view to 
compensate the individual so as to put 
them back in the position they would 
have been in, but for the wrongful 
conviction). The severity and/or nature  
of the conviction and sanction would  
be relevant to determining what level  
of compensation would be appropriate. 
It is not clear from the legislation who  
or what body will be empowered to 
determine if, and how much, 
compensation should be paid. It is also 
not clear whether reasons will be given 
for such a decision and whether such  
a decision will be reviewable. The ACT 
government can still make use of ex 
gratia payments in respect of cases 
falling outside the provisions of the 
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).
There are other issues that also remain 
uncertain about the right under s 23. 
Criminal suspects are routinely extradited 
between Australian jurisdictions and 
overseas. The right created under s 23 is 
not limited by reference to the individual’s 
nationality and domicile, nor the court’s 
location. Where the Australian Capital 
Territory extradites a person interstate or 
overseas, it could be theoretically liable  
if the receiving jurisdiction wrongfully 
convicts the person. It is also unclear if the 
right to compensation survives the death 
of a wrongfully convicted person and can 
be pursued by the person’s family. 
Despite these uncertainties, the ex gratia 
payments currently used in other 
Australian jurisdictions provide even less 
guidance as to whether or how much 
compensation should be paid. 
Causes of wrongful conviction
Causes of wrongful conviction are 
generally either specific to individuals or 
systemic in nature. Causes relevant to the 
individual include factors such as mental 
problems that may lead an individual to 
make a false confession (such as John 
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Mark Kerr who publicly confessed to 
murdering beauty queen JonBenet 
Ramsey but was later cleared by DNA 
evidence – see The Age 2006). Common 
systemic causes are incorrect/false 
eyewitness identification, flawed 
scientific/forensic evidence, fault/
incorrect/self-serving informer evidence, 
police or prosecutor misconduct or 
overzealousness to secure a conviction, 
false confessions, faulty legal 
representation, tunnel vision and, 
perhaps, the effects of the media tainting 
a jury (Weathered 2007). Eyewitness error 
is said to be the most common cause of 
wrongful convictions (Campbell & Denov 
2004 citing Huff, Rattner & Sagarin 1986). 
In many cases a confluence of these 
circumstances contribute to wrongful 
conviction – for example, an overzealous 
prosecution combined with faulty legal 
representation (Huff 2002a; MacFarlane 
2005). While there have been a number 
of wrongful convictions brought about as 
a result of false/faulty forensic evidence, 
paradoxically, many wrongful convictions 
are discovered by the utilisation and/or 
re-evaluation of such evidence (Matthews 
2004; The Age 2007).
Effects of wrongful convictions
Wrongfully convicted people may 
experience psychiatric and emotional 
effects from the conviction and 
subsequent imprisonment. They undergo 
enduring personality changes similar to 
that experienced by people suffering  
a catastrophic experience. They often 
exhibit serious psychiatric morbidity and 
display symptoms of disorders including 
post-traumatic stress disorder (Grounds 
2004). 
Wrongfully convicted people may also 
suffer ongoing emotional effects from the 
conviction and the disengagement from 
society that it brings. Fear of physical 
and/or sexual assault may cause some 
people to develop physically aggressive/
intimidating character traits as a coping 
mechanism. They often exhibit feelings  
of bitterness, loss, threat, paranoia and 
hopelessness. Ironically, the accelerated 
pace of release that the discovery of a 
wrongful conviction will normally herald 
can have adverse effects. The graded 
release mechanisms (i.e. programs to 
facilitate gradual reintegration into the 
community) used in most jurisdictions 
can cause a greater upheaval to the 
person (Grounds 2004). 
Prisoners may lose simple technical 
proficiencies, as well as basic emotional 
coping skills, making it very difficult for 
them to adapt to normal life and maintain 
relationships with family and friends. One 
study found that a majority of wrongfully 
convicted males could not live with 
previous partners even where the partner 
supported them throughout the ordeal of 
the wrongful conviction (Grounds 2004). 
Despite their convictions being quashed, 
wrongfully convicted offenders may also 
continue to be stigmatised by sections of 
the public, including victims of the crimes 
for which they were convicted.
The process of being inducted into  
‘total institutions’ such as a prison 
involves stripping away the prisoner’s 
former identity. A new identity is forced 
upon them by the institution and/or other 
prisoners. This new identity may simply 
be ‘a prisoner’ or ‘an offender’ but also 
may extend to specific identities such  
as ‘a rapist’ or ‘a murderer’ (Campbell  
& Denov 2004; Goffman 1961). The 
acceptance and rejection of these labels 
by wrongfully convicted people involve 
considerable costs in both assimilating  
to the prison environment as well as 
qualifying for privileges (Campbell & 
Denov 2004; Goffman 1961). Maintaining 
what Campbell and Denov refer to as the 
‘burden of innocence’ may be seen by 
prison authorities to evidence a lack  
of rehabilitation, therefore raising a 
prisoner’s risk of recidivism. This may 
considerably impair a prisoner’s chances 
of parole or other privileges. Within prison 
society, some offenders enjoy or suffer 
greater or lesser degrees of respect by 
reference to the crime for which they 
were convicted: sex offenders tend to  
be treated with disdain by prisoners and 
prison administrators, while murderers 
may be accorded a measure of respect, 
at least among fellow prisoners. In such 
an institution, respect may be a valuable 
asset in surviving. Given that wrongful 
convictions often go undetected, 
protesting innocence may not be in one’s 
best interests (Huff 2002b).
Aside from these direct effects of 
accepting or rejecting their wrongful 
conviction, the possibility, however 
unlikely, of their innocence being 
discovered also means that prisoners lack 
certainty of a release date as a yardstick 
upon which to measure the effluxion of 
time (Campbell & Denov 2004). Wrongfully 
convicted people also suffer the physical 
effects of a confined environment, and 
may suffer physical and sexual assault 
whilst incarcerated (Grounds 2004).
Prevalence of  
wrongful conviction
The nature and causes of wrongful 
conviction make it very difficult for reliable 
data to be obtained as to its prevalence. 
In jurisdictions that have functioning, 
independent judiciaries, the general view 
is that these convictions are very unusual. 
There is some evidence that wrongful 
convictions may be less rare than they  
are commonly thought to be. It has been 
estimated that in the United States 
between 0.5 and five percent of all 
offenders in prison have been wrongfully 
convicted (Weathered 2007: 180 citing 
Huff, Rattner & Sagarin 1996: 53–67).  
At least 23 innocent people have been 
executed in the United States (Huff 2002a 
citing Bedau & Radelet 1987 and Radelet, 
Bedau & Putnam 1992). Liebman et al. 
(2000) found serious appealable errors in 
nearly seven out of 10 potentially capital 
cases. While the wrongful conviction 
cases involving capital punishment are 
the most visible, emotive and sensational, 
the great majority of wrongful conviction 
cases in the United States and abroad 
involve non-capital offences. These 
people serve unwarranted sanctions and 
are left with shattered lives as a result of 
the physical and emotional damage 
suffered (Huff 2002a).
In the United Kingdom, it has been 
informally estimated that the wrongful 
conviction rate may be as high as 0.1 
percent of all criminal cases (Huff 2002a 
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citing Criminal Cases Review Commission 
2001). In the United States, indirect 
methods have been used to estimate  
the rate of wrongful conviction – a study 
found that 25 percent of prime suspects 
were excluded prior to trial where DNA 
testing was used. Most trials do not make 
use of DNA testing which means that an 
even larger number of defendants may 
get convicted based on other evidence 
(Scheck, Neufeld & Dwyer 2000).
Qualifying for and determining 
the quantum of compensation
Compensation levels for wrongful 
conviction in Australia and overseas  
are generally not as generous as those 
for normal tortious claims such as 
negligence, or even for claims such as 
false imprisonment (Percy 2007; Taylor 
2003). False imprisonment cases are 
quite uncommon, so it is difficult to  
arrive at a clear tariff for the tort, but the 
following cases give an idea of the level 
of damages ordered: 
A protestor in Queensland who  •	
was refused entry into a sitting of 
Parliament and wrongfully removed 
and imprisoned by police for a matter 
of hours was awarded $20,000 plus 
interest. The judge found that the 
plaintiff had suffered little or no 
shame, indignity and mental suffering 
but nevertheless had had his rights 
violated (Coleman v Watson [2007] 
QSC 343, BC200709939).
A NSW man who was wrongfully •	
arrested and imprisoned by police  
for 56 days pursuant to an ultra vires 
order of a magistrate (for failing to  
pay costs of an earlier unsuccessful 
prosecution) was awarded $75,000 
plus interest (Spautz v Butterworth 
(1996) 41 NSWLR 1).
A NSW man attended a police station •	
for an interview and was arrested, 
charged and detained for three hours 
in relation to a number of separate 
matters. It later transpired there were 
no reasonable grounds for the arrest. 
The man was awarded $25,000 plus 
interest (Zaravinos v NSW (2005) 214 
ALR 234).
Where ex gratia compensation payments 
are made in Australian jurisdictions,  
they would seem to encompass both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss to  
the person (that is, loss that is easily 
quantifiable, such as loss of income)  
and loss that is not readily calculable 
(such as pain and suffering or the loss  
of the expectations of life).
Taylor (2003: 232) estimates 
compensation in the United Kingdom to 
be on average, including both pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary loss, £13,000–
£14,000 for each year the person has 
been imprisoned. Taylor cites the case  
of a soldier wrongfully convicted and 
imprisoned for 25 years who was 
awarded £350,000, which translates  
to about £14,000 a year. 
Ex gratia compensation payments  
in Australia have been described as 
‘somewhat arbitrary’ and generally ‘very 
modest’, making it difficult to establish 
any formal or informal tariff of damages 
payable (Percy 2007). The broad 
discretion in awarding and lack of 
transparency surrounding these payments 
makes it difficult to determine what types 
of situations will result in an ex gratia 
payment at all, regardless of its size.
In the Chamberlain case, Lindy 
Chamberlain received an ex gratia 
payment of $1.3m, as well as $396,000 
for legal costs and $19,000 for the family 
car which had been effectively destroyed 
as a result of forensic investigations. She 
was imprisoned for approximately four 
years before her sentence was remitted 
and an inquiry convened into the matter 
(Victorian Bar 2005; see also Re 
Conviction of Chamberlain (1988) 93  
FLR 239). 
Percy (2007) discusses a number of 
other awards. In 1979, Tim Anderson, 
Ross Dunn and Paul Alister were 
convicted in New South Wales of 
conspiracy to murder and sentenced to 
16 years in prison. After serving seven 
years imprisonment, they were 
unconditionally pardoned and were each 
awarded a $100,000 ex gratia payment. 
In 1980, Douglas Rendell was convicted 
of murdering his wife in New South Wales 
and after serving eight years in jail, was 
awarded a $100,000 ex gratia payment. 
In 2003, a WA man, John Button, was 
cleared of a 1962 murder and awarded  
a $400,000 ex gratia payment. Lastly,  
in 2006, a Perth man, Andrew Mallard 
(Mallard v R [2005] HCA 68, 
BC200509688), was cleared of a  
murder for which he served 12 years of 
imprisonment. Mallard’s application for an 
ex gratia payment is still under review, but 
he has already been granted an interim 
ex gratia payment of $200,000.
Percy (2007) notes that while a small 
number of people who are wrongfully 
convicted are successful in getting an  
ex gratia payment, many get no 
compensation whatsoever. 
Factors such as long duration of 
imprisonment and the presence of 
negligence or malice of government 
officials would generally seem to increase 
both the likelihood and the size of an ex 
gratia payment, although these factors are 
not rigidly adhered to (Zdenkowski 1993). 
Factors that may lower the chances  
and/or size of an ex gratia payment are  
the presence of either prior criminality 
generally, or lesser criminal culpability  
in relation to the conduct surrounding 
wrongful conviction (Taylor 2005; Young 
2007). Superior UK courts have ruled in 
favour of allowing deductions commonly 
made in tort matters to the pecuniary 
portion of compensation awards to reflect 
living costs such as food and lodgings 
that the wrongfully imprisoned individual 
did not have to pay whilst imprisoned. In 
one case, a 25 percent deduction to the 
loss of earnings portion of the award  
was confirmed on appeal. Academics, 
lawyers and the press have criticised this 
rather mean approach to such awards 
(Taylor 2005), but Australian jurisdictions 
would take a similar approach.
Conclusion
So long as Australia maintains its 
reservation to article 14(6) of the ICCPR, 
the system of ex gratia payments used  
in most Australian jurisdictions will not 
The AIC is a statutory body with a 
Board of Management comprising 
Australian, state and territory 
government representatives, 
administered under the Criminology 
Research Act 1971.
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breach Australia’s international 
obligations. However, these ex gratia 
payments lack transparency and are 
somewhat arbitrary in terms of when 
compensation will be offered and how  
it will be quantified (Walsh 1994). While 
governments should be able to properly 
balance the surrounding circumstances 
of a case against the wrongful conviction 
itself, they should also foster a process 
for determining such claims fairly and 
appropriately, if not generously. 
It would be appropriate for compensation 
for wrongful conviction to be calculated  
in a similar manner to damages for false 
imprisonment. It would also be desirable 
for the criteria upon which these 
decisions are based to be publicly 
available, and that reasons be given  
for any such decision. 
It would be preferable for each Australian 
state and territory to either implement 
legislation akin to the Human Rights Act 
2004 (ACT) or draft specific guidelines for 
the award of compensation to wrongfully 
convicted people (akin to those used  
in New Zealand). Victoria recently 
introduced its own human rights 
legislation, which did not include such  
a provision, but there are a number of 
other Australian jurisdictions currently 
considering the feasibility of human  
rights legislation. 
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